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ABSTRACT

PRESERVING TRUST ACROSS MULTIPLE SESSIONS
IN OPEN SYSTEMS

Fuk Wing Thomas Chan
Department of Computer Science
Master of Science

Trust negotiation, a new authentication paradigm, enables strangers on the Internet
to establish trust through the gradual disclosure of digital credentials and access
control policies. Previous research in trust negotiation does not address issues in
preserving trust across multiple sessions. This thesis discusses issues in preserving
trust between parties who were previously considered strangers. It also describes
the design and implementation of trust preservation in TrustBuilder, a prototype
trust negotiation system. Preserving trust information can reduce the frequency
and cost of renegotiation. A scenario is presented that demonstrates that a server
supporting trust preservation can recoup the cost of the trust preservation facility
when approximately 25% of its requests are from repeat customers. The throughput
and response time improve up to approximately 33% as the percentage of repeat
customers grows to 100%.
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Chapter 1 — Introduction

1.1

Overview of trust negotiation
Trust negotiation, a new authentication paradigm, enables strangers on the In-

ternet to establish trust or proof of qualification through the gradual disclosure of
credentials and access control policies [4, 15, 16]. In open systems like the Internet, the majority of transactions are between strangers—entities that are not in the
same security domain and do not have a pre-existing relationship. The identity of
the participants is often irrelevant, unknown, or must remain private. Under such
circumstances, identity-based authentication is not suitable. Trust negotiation is designed to allow strangers to authenticate one another based on attributes contained
in digital credentials.
Digital credentials are unforgeable and verifiable. The attributes embedded in a
credential are asserted and signed by a trusted third party known as a certificate
authority (CA). A common format for a digital credential is an X.509v3 certificate.
1.1.1

Trust negotiation example

The following is a simple example of trust negotiation. Alice has an accident
while she is hiking out-of-state. A rescue team air lifts her to an emergency room
(ER). Before Doctor Bob, the on-call anesthesiologist, prescribes any pain medication to Alice, he needs to find out whether Alice is allergic to any medication. The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) prohibits Alice’s health care provider, Jones Clinic (JC), from releasing her medical records except
to a qualified physician who is providing treatment to her.1 Doctor Bob possesses
an anesthesiologist credential that is signed by the American Medical Association
1

This oversimplified example conveys the general idea of HIPAA.

1
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Figure 1.1: A simplified trust negotiation.
(AMA). Doctor Bob only discloses his credential to other physicians and health care
organizations to avoid unwanted solicitation from salespersons. Jones Clinic possesses
a credential stating that it is a registered and licensed health care facility under the
state department of health.
Figure 1.1 depicts the trust negotiation process between Doctor Bob and JC.
Doctor Bob’s client software requests Alice’s medical records from JC’s server. JC’s
server requests a credential proving that Doctor Bob is a qualified physician. Bob’s
client requests a credential proving that JC is a physician or a health-care organization. Since the JC’s health care credential is freely available upon request, JC’s server
sends the credential to Bob’s client. After verifying the credential, Bob’s client releases his anesthesiologist credential. JC’s server examines and verifies the credential,
and then releases Alice’s health care records to Bob.
1.1.2

Sensitive credentials

The trust negotiation process is analogous to how strangers can build credibility
or establish mutual trust through exchanging paper credentials. In trust negotiation,
digital credentials are gradually disclosed and exchanged. It is common for people to
hesitate to disclose credentials that contain their sensitive information to strangers.
Similar to paper credentials, digital credentials may contain sensitive information
(attributes) like birth date, credit card number, personal health information, social
2
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security number, or weight. When attributes in a digital credential are sensitive, an
access control policy can control its disclosure. In the example above, Doctor Bob
protected his anesthesiologist credential with an access control policy allowing only
physicians or health-care organizations to access his credential.
1.1.3

Sensitive policies

Doctor Bob’s access control policy governs the disclosure of his physician credential. The policy defines the attributes a requester must possess in order to access
his credential. Anyone who requests Doctor Bob’s AMA physician credential will
be asked to disclose a physician credential, health-care organization credential, radiologist credential, or stem cell research credential. Bob’s counter request might
be enough evidence for a salesperson to target him for nuclear medicine products.
Similarly, the requirement for a stem cell research credential might cause members
in the Physicians for Life organization to assume Dr. Bob is a pro-choice physician.
Thus, Dr. Bob may consider his policy as sensitive information and desire to limit
its disclosure.
A trust negotiation can be simple and direct, as in the example involving Dr.
Bob and JC. However, when both parties possess sensitive credentials or either party
possesses a sensitive policy, a trust negotiation can expand to multiple rounds.
1.2

Motivation
Discussions of trust negotiation in the current research literature are often based

on per-request access-control. Also, the current implementations of trust negotiation
are designed to perform per-request access-control. A trust negotiation occurs every time a sensitive service or resource is requested. Even if the same resource or a
resource with the same access control policy is requested multiple times, trust negotiation occurs for each request. This is obviously wasteful. If the resource requester
has already authenticated sufficiently to receive a resource, why should he have to
3
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re-authenticate for the same resource or different resources with the same access control policy? In fact, why should he have to re-authenticate when all of his relevant
credentials are still valid?
The lack of trust preservation means that if a client requests the same resource five
times, the client and server negotiate trust five times. The client and server negotiate
trust when a different resource is accessed, even if the resources have the same access
control policy. Since trust is not preserved, this behavior applies to requests within
a single session and across multiple sessions. In multi-session interactions, once a
session is terminated, so is the relationship of trust between the participants. Similar
to multi-session, trust is terminated after each request within a single session. Recent
research proposes an approach to caching trust within a single session [8]. In contrast,
this thesis focuses on preserving trust across multiple sessions.
The performance overhead for renegotiating trust increases when a negotiation
involves multiple exchanges of policies and credentials. The cost of validating credentials increases linearly with the number of credentials received from the other
negotiator. Network bandwidth and latency also increases linearly with the number
of negotiation rounds. The overhead of renegotiating trust unnecessarily consumes
network bandwidth and increases computational load. Preserving the trust already
established between a client and server reduces these overheads.
The problem of trust preservation is similar to the single sign-on problem in
identity-based authentication, where solutions are intended to avoid requiring users
to enter a password repeatedly. The situation is different in trust negotiation because
the goal is to fully automate the trust negotiation process. Automated trust negotiation takes place without direct user involvement. In this case, trust preservation is
mostly a performance issue. However, there may be situations where fully automated
trust negotiation is not feasible, and a user must be consulted to make authorization
4
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decisions, such as determining whether or not a credential is disclosed or determining which credentials to disclose. In this case, avoiding the need for user interaction
during repeated negotiations is akin to the single sign-on problem for identity-based
authentication systems.
1.3

Research goals
The goal of this research is to design and develop an approach for preserving trust

in open systems that reduces the performance overhead to establish trust and eases
the burden on users during semi-automated trust negotiation.
As proposed by [8], once a client and server negotiate trust, the server should
retain the client’s authentication information until the end of the session. Similarly,
the client should cache the server’s authentication information. By simply retaining relevant authentication information, the frequency of renegotiation can be vastly
reduced.
Trust established during a client’s first session with a server should be retained
through subsequent sessions. It would also be convenient and more efficient for trust
to persist across multiple sessions among servers in the same security domain or across
trusted security domains.
Trust persistence promises to make authenticating strangers in open systems more
efficient. Trust persistence also allows strangers to make friends—the relationship of
trust persists, because the parties involved are no longer foreign to each other. Having
authenticated each other once, they do not need to perform the same expensive level
of authentication again.
1.4

Thesis statement
Trust is not persistent in the current trust negotiation model. Thus, a trusted

principal is always required to reestablish trust on every subsequent request. This
hinders the response time and throughput of a system in delivering resources to users.
5
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In addition, this model decreases the battery lifetime of resource-constrained clients
(e.g., PDAs and cell phones).
This thesis presents the design of two approaches for preserving trust across multiple sessions. Experimental prototypes of these two approaches were created using
TrustBuilder, a prototype trust negotiation system under development in the Internet Security Research Lab at Brigham Young University (see http://isrl.cs.byu.edu).
These prototypes illustrate two ways to deploy the current trust negotiation model.
The first approach, a stand-alone design that manages both authentication and
authorization, introduces a Trust Resumption Token (TRT) that captures the details
of a trust negotiation occurring in one session and makes it possible to reestablish
trust during subsequent sessions more efficiently. The second approach is an integrated design to deploy TrustBuilder with an existing access control system. Many
authentication and authorization systems are identity-based. In contrast to TrustBuilder, these identity-based systems are not designed to authenticate or authorize
strangers. This integrated approach enables these existing systems to authenticate
and authorize strangers.
The focus of this thesis is to develop approaches to preserving trust. The integration of TrustBuilder with existing systems eases the deployment of trust negotiation
technology. Trust preservation reduces the cost of credential validation during subsequent visits from a cost that increases linearly according to the number of credentials
received to a cost that is constant regardless of the number of credentials involved in
the negotiation. It also consolidates multiple rounds of negotiation into an exchange
of one policy and one token. Trust preservation increases the throughput of systems
delivering resources to users, resulting in a decrease in response time to users.
6
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1.5

Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the design

and implementation of the trust resumption token. Chapter 3 describes the design
of the integration of TrustBuilder with Kerberos, a popular authentication system.
It also presents the design and implementation of the integration of TrustBuilder
with KeyNote, an existing authorization system. Chapter 4 contains a performance
analysis of the TRT implementation. Related work is presented in Chapter 5. The
final chapter contains conclusions and proposes future research directions.

7
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Chapter 2 — Trust Preservation using a TRT

An approach to preserving trust across multiple sessions is to use a certified token
known as an authenticator. A server can issue an authenticator to a client following
a successful negotiation. The client can use the token to efficiently reestablish trust
with the server during subsequent sessions. This thesis refers to such an authenticator
as a Trust Resumption Token (TRT).
This chapter presents some design goals for a TRT and discusses several design
alternatives for using a trust resumption token to preserve the trust that is established
between two negotiators across multiple sessions.
Figure 2.1 illustrates an extension of the previous medical example of a trust
negotiation between Dr. Bob and JC. Suppose Alice’s condition intensifies the following day, and Dr. Bob needs to review a different medical record of Alice before
he prescribes different medicine and treatment to her. With the new design, Bob
acquires an authenticator from JC’s server along with Alice’s records the first time
he has successfully negotiated with JC. Now, he can re-access Alice’s records using
the authenticator and eliminate the need to re-negotiate with JC’s server.
2.1

Design goals
The following are the design goals for using a TRT:
• Integrity: detect when data in the TRT has been altered
• Authenticity: obtain evidence that the client submitting the TRT is its rightful
owner
• Validation: validate that the corresponding credentials that were used to issue
the token are still valid and have not been revoked
9
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Figure 2.1: An extended example to illustrate the usage of an authenticator
• Privacy or confidentiality: limit the disclosure of sensitive attributes in the
token to the server
• Performance: reduce the computational requirements for trust negotiation

A server can digitally sign the TRT when it is issued so that the integrity of a
TRT can be determined when a client presents it to a server in the future. A TRT
can be implemented using X.509v3 certificates.
A server could include the following attributes in the TRT: relevant attributes
of the user, a list of unique public keys, a list of serial numbers and issuer names,
and an expiration date. The following discussion addresses the benefits of storing attributes of the user, and how the other items contribute to the integrity, authenticity,
confidentiality, and validity of the TRT.
10
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First, the attributes that were initially required to access the requested resource
could be included in the TRT. Servers that receive the TRT in the future can use
these attributes to determine what resources the requester is entitled to access. This
approach enables the access privileges associated with the token to dynamically evolve
as an access control policy changes. Compared to storing permissions in a TRT, this
reduces the threat of requesters retaining the privileges associated with the original
policy when a policy update occurs. It also lessens the need to revoke tokens when
policies are modified.
Sometimes, a TRT can contain sensitive attributes or roles. In such cases, the
privacy and confidentiality of this sensitive information can be protected in different
ways. For example, the server could encrypt this information using the server’s public
key or a symmetric key known only by the server. This would prevent unauthorized
access by an eavesdropper or an attacker that gains access to the TRT stored on disk.
Also, a server that does not need to maintain a permanent copy of a client credential
could avoid storing it on disk to reduce the server’s liability and to reduce the risk of
the server becoming a prime target of an identity thief.
A server accepting a TRT must determine whether the client submitting the TRT
is the legitimate owner. One approach to determining ownership of the TRT is to link
the TRT to the original certificates that were instrumental to the issuing of the TRT.
The public keys contained in the original certificates are stored in the TRT. When
the TRT is presented, the server can challenge the client for the corresponding private
keys. Another approach is to generate a new public/private key pair specific to the
TRT and store the public key in the TRT. The server can challenge for ownership of
the private key when the TRT is presented.
The certificates used to authenticate the client in order for the TRT to be issued
could be revoked because one of the attribute values has changed or become invalid.
11
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A server may not want to accept the TRT when this occurs. One approach to detect
this situation is to include a list of serial numbers and issuer names in the TRT from
the relevant credentials that caused the TRT to be issued. The server can verify if
any of the asserted attributes are still valid by acquiring the certificate revocation
lists (CRLs) that correspond to the source credentials.
The certificates used to authenticate the client expire at various times. The expiration date of the TRT can be set to be the expiration date of the source credential
that expires first. This ensures that the TRT is only valid so long as all of the source
credentials have not expired.
A difficult issue in certificate systems is the lending problem. This refers to the
unauthorized sharing of security tokens. The general problem is beyond the scope
of this thesis. However, in some cases challenging the ownership of the tokens can
discourage owners from lending tokens to other parties especially when sensitive attributes are stored in these tokens. The ownership challenge process requires the
bearer to encrypt an unpredictable message with private keys that are associated
with the public keys included in the token. As users would also need to share private
keys to accomplish the challenge, they may be less inclined to share their tokens.
The information contained in a trust negotiation authenticator could be based on
attributes, roles, or permissions. Attributes are characteristics of an individual. They
are commonly contained in a digital credential certified by an authority (a trusted
third party). Roles typically represent various functions in an organization and are
granted certain permissions [14]. Permissions are the ability to access a resource
or a service. In trust negotiation, attributes are mapped to roles, and each role is
associated with a set of permissions. The design decision of what information to
store in an authenticator must consider tradeoffs between computation cost, storage
requirements, and the frequency of renegotiation.
12
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For example, suppose that service S1 can be accessed by role R1 , and service S2
can be accessed by role R2 . Attribute A1 plus attribute A2 or attribute A3 alone
can authenticate to R1 , whereas A1 alone can authenticate to R2 . Assume client C
succeeds in requesting access for S1 , and receives an authenticator for future access.

If the authenticator contains only the roles to which a client has authenticated,
when the client attempts to access a service requiring a different role, the server may
be unable to determine whether the client has already presented enough information
to authenticate to the role, even if it requires some of the same attributes. Suppose
client C tries to access S2 . He cannot re-use the authenticator since the server does
not know whether the authenticator was issued based on attribute A1 or not. A rolebased authenticator works well when future client requests require authentication to
the same role. In a more dynamic environment where a client assumes various roles
based on different attributes, role-based authenticators may not be the most efficient
option.

If the authenticator contains only the attributes the client used to authenticate
to a role, when the client attempts to access a different service the server can simply
determine which roles are required to access the service and determine whether the
stored attributes permit or qualify the client to authenticate to those roles. Suppose
client C tries to access S2 . The only required attribute to authenticate to role R2 is A1 .
Thus, client C can access R2 only when the authenticator contains A1 . Unlike rolebased authenticators, attribute-based authenticators always require the additional
mapping between attributes and roles. An attribute-based authenticator preserves
the authenticated attributes from a client—thus preserving the possibility of mapping
those attributes to other roles during future requests.
13
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2.2

Trust resumption token
In this thesis, the design for preserving trust calls for attributes to be stored in an

authenticator rather than storing roles or permissions. This thesis further proposes
the use of signed digital credentials as the logical structure for trust authenticators.
During a single trust negotiation, the server extracts attributes and other information from the credentials disclosed by the client. If the negotiation succeeds, the
server generates and signs a credential—the trust resumption token—and delivers it
to the client along with the requested resource. A trust resumption token contains
the following: those attributes that were required to access a secure resource, a list
of unique public keys that are associated with the attributes, a list of serial numbers and issuer names from the relevant credentials, and the expiration date from the
credential that expires first. With this token, a client can re-access the server and
quickly reestablish the same degree of trust that was previously established, avoiding
needless repetition of a lengthy negotiation process.
Trust resumption tokens contain attributes rather than roles or permissions for the
following reasons. In trust negotiation, attributes are the lowest common denominator
of trust. The mapping from attributes to roles obviously requires attributes, and the
mapping from roles to permissions is therefore also based on attributes. Because
attributes are the basis of trust, attributes are less likely to change than roles or
permissions. The definition of a role contains a logic expression based on attributes;
that logic expression may change according to the security needs of the system. The
issue of changes to a role definition also applies to permissions. If a TRT contains
permission to access a particular file on the server and then the access-control policy
for the file changes, the holder of the TRT can still access the file until either the TRT
is revoked or it expires, regardless of the updated access-control policy. Changes to
the definition of a role or permission introduce additional insecurities into the system.
14
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If roles or permissions are stored in a TRT, revocation of the TRT becomes a
serious issue. When there is a change in a role definition or the permissions to access
a resource, any holder of a TRT issued previously would still be able to access the
resource even though they may no longer be authorized to hold that role or exercise
the permission. One way to mitigate this risk is to limit the lifetime of a TRT.
2.2.1

TRT example

The following example illustrates how a TRT is used to resume trust. Suppose
Alice requests service S from Bob, and the access control policy for S requires that
Alice possess attributes A1 , A2 , and A3 .
Alice’s C1 credential contains A1 , and A2 . A3 is contained in Alice’s C2 credential.
According to Alice’s access control policy, C1 is freely available only upon request and
C2 is only to be disclosed to a requestor who can demonstrate ownership of attribute
A4 . Alice discloses her C1 credential to Bob and requests proof that Bob has attribute
A4 . Bob indeed possesses A4 in his C3 credential, and it is freely available only upon
request. Bob collects Alice’s C1 and discloses his C3 to Alice. Alice discloses her C2
credential after she receives Bob’s C3 credential. Upon receiving Alice’s C2 credential,
Bob generates a TRT that contains attributes A1 , A2 , and A3 , both issuer names and
public keys of the credentials, and the expiration date of the credential which will
expire the soonest. Then Bob grants Alice access to S and sends her the TRT.
Figure 2.2 shows the flow of the negotiation between Alice and Bob.
Trust negotiation can involve additional credentials and more rounds of negotiation than this simple example illustrates. Using the TRT during a later session, a
client can resume the same level of trust with only one credential and one round of
negotiation. Figure 2.3 shows the flow of a negotiation between Alice and Bob with
more rounds of negotiation.
Based on the given Alice and Bob example, the TRT allows Alice to re-access
15
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Figure 2.2: The trust negotiation flow between Alice and Bob.

Figure 2.3: The trust negotiation flow between Alice and Bob with multiple rounds
of negotiation.
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Figure 2.4: Alice’s TRT

service S and all other services with the same access control policy, or a subset of
the policy. The TRT illustrated in Figure 2.4 is a simplified version for demonstration purposes only. It does not include all the necessary fields in a typical X.509v3
certificate.
Figure 2.5 shows Alice using the TRT to resume the level of trust she established
previously with Bob. In this figure, Alice requests the same service S from Bob. Bob
replies to Alice with the access control policy for the service. As before, Bob’s access
control policy requires attributes A1 . A2 , and A3 . Instead of sending credentials C1
17
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Figure 2.5: Alice resumes the trust level using TRT.
and the access control policies for credential C2 to Bob, Alice replies with the TRT
that Bob previously issued to her. Upon receiving Alice’s TRT, Bob checks that the
TRT is valid, and then checks it against the access control policy before granting
Alice access to S.
Bob checks the validity of the TRT by verifying its signature, verifying that it has
not expired, and verifying that Alice owns it by challenging Alice for possession of
the private keys associated with the public keys contained in the TRT. Bob can also
verify that the source credentials used to obtain the attributes in the TRT have not
been revoked by checking the certificate revocation lists for the credentials using the
Issuer and Serial # fields contained in the token.
2.2.2

TRT usage in a federation

The potential for multiple servers to join in an alliance to share authentication
information introduces another opportunity to utilize a TRT. Alliance servers have
a preexisting trust relationship with the token’s issuer, similar to many single signon paradigms like the Liberty Alliance Project [7] and Microsoft Passport [11]. In
contrast to the Liberty Alliance Project and Microsoft Passport, trust-negotiationenabled single sign-on is attribute-based.
For example, if a group of trusted servers adopt a common set of roles, then a
18
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server could issue a TRT to designate that the client satisfies a particular role, and
other servers could accept the TRT for rapid authentication to the same role in their
local domain. Another approach is for the servers to accept a common set of attributes
and map clients to local roles based on those attributes. An approach that combines
both attributes and roles in the TRT is also possible.

19
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Chapter 3 — Trust Preservation using Kerberos
and KeyNote

A fundamental task for a system that provides protected services and resources is
to determine the trustworthiness of clients that access the system. Traditional approaches to establishing trust assume that the interacting parties are already familiar
with each other. Under this assumption, there are essentially two approaches. The
first approach is the identity-based approach, which identifies whether a client is indeed who it claims to be. Kerberos is an example of a system based on this approach.
The second approach is the capability-based approach, which determines if a client
has the capability (authority) to access the services or resources it is requesting.
KeyNote is an example of a system based on this approach.
Traditional approaches to trust establishment are not suitable for establishing
trust between complete strangers. This chapter describes how existing systems can
leverage trust negotiation to establish trust with complete strangers, and how trust
negotiation systems, like TrustBuilder, can leverage existing systems to preserve trust.
3.1

Kerberos integration
Kerberos is a distributed identity-based authentication system developed at MIT.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the system architecture. This section presents a high-level design
of integrating Kerberos with TrustBuilder for preserving trust across multiple sessions
and describes how this integration can open Kerberos services to strangers with qualified attributes. This integration of TrustBuilder with Kerberos allows strangers to
obtain a limited form of trust preservation, which makes it possible for these currently
authenticated strangers to reestablish trust during subsequent sessions and to request
other services within a realm more efficiently.
21
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Figure 3.1: The Kerberos distributed authentication system architecture.
Kerberos was originally designed for closed systems; the client must have a preexisting relationship with the Kerberos Authentication Server. Typically, Kerberos
users need to establish and obtain their Kerberos username and password prior to
accessing any services that are protected behind the Kerberos system. In Kerberos,
a ticket is required for a user to access a service. Kerberos manages tickets with a
key distribution center (KDC), which consists of an authentication server (AS) and
a ticket-granting server (TGS). After a client is authenticated to the AS with its
Kerberos username and password, the AS issues a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) to
the client. Later, the client can use the TGT to request access to different services
through the TGS. Authentication to the AS is preserved within the TGT. As such,
an authenticated client does not have to re-authenticate to the AS in order to access
other services. Instead, clients can request other services by requesting a service
granting ticket from the TGS, as long as their TGT is still valid and has not expired.
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Figure 3.2: A simple design for integrating TrustBuilder with Kerberos.
This two-level design eliminates the need for authenticated clients to reenter their
Kerberos password for every requested service [9].
The process of establishing and obtaining a Kerberos user name and password is
typically based on identity. As it has been stated previously, this process is not practical in an open system where users have no pre-existing relationship. Kerberos can
be extended to support authentication of strangers by integrating trust negotiation
into the initial authentication step between a Kerberos client and the AS, as shown
in Figure 3.2.
One approach to integrating Kerberos and TrustBuilder is to embed TrustBuilder
in the AS module. Hereafter, we will refer to the AS module extended with TrustBuilder as a trust-negotiation-enabled AS (TNAS). This enhanced AS permits a
stranger to negotiate a service through a negotiation process similar to what was
described in Chapter 1. Upon a successful negotiation, TNAS maps a user’s submit23
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ted attributes to a pseudo-id that corresponds to the requested role of the user. The
TNAS returns a TGT for the pseudo-id that entitles the user to access services in
the Kerberos realm for which the pseudo-id is authorized. This approach opens up
Kerberos services to users outside the Kerberos realm.
In this design, TrustBuilder is used to interface with all the strangers outside the
Kerberos realm. The TGT obtained through TrustBuilder preserves the trust that is
established during the initial trust negotiation between the user and the TNAS. Since
the TGT is reusable until it expires, the authenticated strangers can use the TGT to
request other services within the Kerberos realm that the pseudo-id is authorized to
access.
3.2

KeyNote integration
KeyNote is a capability-based trust management system designed to assist ap-

plications in authorizing user’s requests. Figure 3.3 illustrates how KeyNote can be
used to answer the following question: should the requested action by this subject
be permitted (or authorized) for a given policy and a set of credentials? The task of
authenticating the subject is left to the application.

Figure 3.3: Applications use KeyNote to determine whether a client is authorized for
a requested service.
24
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KeyNote is a general-purpose, distributed trust management system that is designed for access control policies to be distributed over a network or otherwise decentralized [1–3]. It uses a unified format and a highly expressive language to describe its
access control policies and credentials. Figure 3.4 is an example taken from [1], that
illustrates how KeyNote access control policies and credentials can be used in a spending application. In this example, A is the root policy and C is an extended policy.
These policies typically remain local to the application. B and C are signed policies;
they are often referred to as credential assertions or simply credentials. These credentials are issued and signed by a trusted principal, or in this case, the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO). According to the root policy, the CFO is a trusted principal that is
authorized to make expenditures under $10,000. As shown in Figure 3.4, KeyNote
credentials and policies share the same structure and syntax. KeyNote credentials
provide a vehicle for a trusted principal to delegate trust and authority to other principals. The credentials are signed to ensure integrity so that they can be distributed
over an untrusted network.
KeyNote policies and credentials are collectively known as assertions. A KeyNote
credential is capability-based, i.e., it describes authorized actions, and can provide
specific delegation of trust to other principals. A credential also identifies the delegator. KeyNote assertions are necessary for a user to access a secure service. In
order for an application to make use of KeyNote, it needs to provide the user’s identity ( ACTION AUTHORIZERS), the application’s identifier (app domain), action
description, a set of policies for the application, and a set of credential assertions
for KeyNote to determine if the user is in compliance with the access control policies. The example in Figure 3.5 depicts the process of a manager, with a public
key RSA:abc123, requesting a $99 expenditure from a spending application, and the
authorization query made by the spending application to KeyNote.
25
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Figure 3.4: A spending application using KeyNote to determine a user’s spending
power.
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The following design is one way to integrate TrustBuilder with KeyNote. In this
design, TrustBuilder will act as proxy for each application to negotiate with strangers
given an attribute-based policy which contains the required attributes for accessing
each application. For example, suppose a jukebox application is serving music on
demand to any full-time student. David is a fulltime student that is a stranger to
the jukebox application. David negotiates with TrustBuilder for access to the music
server. Once David’s negotiation is successful, TrustBuilder delegates the capability
for accessing the service to David by issuing him a KeyNote credential assertion. This
credential assertion would look like the following:

KeyNote-Version: 2
Comment: This credential is issued to a stranger who is authenticated
by TrustBuilder, and approved to access the requested music
Authorizer: "RSA:TB-Key"

\# From TrustBuilder

Licensees: "DSA:David-Key"

\# The authenticated stranger

Conditions: (app_domain="music")

\# requested song from the music server

Signature: "RSA-SHA1:186123"

\# signed by TrustBuilder

By integrating TrustBuilder with KeyNote, strangers with qualified attributes can
be authenticated through trust negotiation. Then, TrustBuilder can issue a KeyNote
credential assertion to the authenticated user. With this credential assertion, a user
is authorized to access resources without repeating the negotiation process. The
integration of trust negotiation with KeyNote is the first working example of trust
negotiation integrated with an existing authorization system.
The implementation of trust preservation for this section is based on KeyNote
version 2 and TrustBuilder version 1. Binary and source files for KeyNote are freely
28

3.2. KEYNOTE INTEGRATION

!"
#$

%""&

!"
'
'

()
()
#
#

*

%
+

&

!"

!"
*,-./0, 1

Figure 3.6: The KeyNote API.

available from the KeyNote Web Page at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/˜keynote/. At
the time of this writing, all the available versions and implementations of KeyNote are
written in the C programming language. In contrast to KeyNote, TrustBuilder is written in Java. In order for TrustBuilder to interact with KeyNote, a KeyNote-wrapper
class was written using the Java Native Interface (JNI) based on the KeyNote Application Programming Interface (API). The KeyNote API can be located in Keynote.h,
one of the header files. Figure 3.6 shows a subset of the API that has been implemented as the KeyNote-wrapper class. This KeyNote-wrapper class allows TrustBuilder to interface with KeyNote programmatically. This API provides a way for
TrustBuilder to generate a credential assertion for a user. The API also permits
TrustBuilder to query KeyNote to determine whether a user is compliant with the
given policy provided by the application.
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Current literature does not address how a particular application user can automatically acquire a KeyNote assertion for accessing services provided by the application.
The integration of TrustBuilder with KeyNote allows the issuing of assertions to
strangers on demand. This chapter discussed two different approaches to integrate
existing systems with TrustBuilder. This chapter also covered the design of integrating TrustBuilder with Kerberos and KeyNote, showed how a complete stranger can
authenticate to a Kerberos system to acquire a Kerberos ticket, and how a stranger
can acquire a KeyNote assertion on demand.
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This chapter contains a performance analysis of an extension to TrustBuilder that
supports the trust resumption token described in Chapter 2. This extension enables
TrustBuilder to preserve trust once it is established via trust negotiation. The extended version of TrustBuilder is referred to as TB-TRT in the remainder of this
chapter. TB-TRT includes the following extensions to TrustBuilder:
• Server issues a resumption token to clients after a successful negotiation
• Client stores the resumption token on local machine
• Client uses corresponding resumption token to request a resource from a server
• Server allows a client to access resources with a valid resumption token
The performance analysis in this chapter compares TB-TRT to the use of TrustBuilder without a TRT, known as TB-noTRT. The results will demonstrate circumstances where a server can increase its throughput using a TRT, resulting in a reduction in the response time experienced by clients.
The following sections in this chapter are organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the characteristics of the test platform and the test suites used to measure the
throughput and response time of the TB-TRT and TB-noTRT systems. Section 4.2
presents the performance analysis results of the system throughput and response time
of the TB-TRT and TB-noTRT systems.
4.1

Experimental framework
The performance analysis was conducted using a typical client/server architecture.

The client and the server were Intel-based Pentium 4 (P4) machines connected directly
31
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Client

Server

P4 1.4GHz

P4 1.7GHz

Memory

512 MB

512 MB

Network

100-Mbps

100-Mbps

CPU

Table 4.1: Client and server specifications

to a 100-Mbps Ethernet segment. The characteristics of these test platforms in terms
of their computation power, physical memory and network speed are summarized in
Table 4.1.
JMeter is a load and performance testing application available through the Apache
Jakarta Project (see http://jakarta.apache.org/jmeter/index.html). JMeter uses a
full multi-threading framework to simulate multi-user requests. JMeter was installed
and run on the client to assist in analyzing the performance of TrustBuilder under
various load conditions.
Using JMeter, five test groups were defined consisting of a group of users simultaneously requesting a protected resource from the server. The number of users in a
group range from five to twenty-five, in increments of five. Each user in a test group
repeats the same request to the server one hundred times with a one second delay
between each request. Figure 4.1 depicts how these test groups interact with the
server.
Three variations of TrustBuilder were evaluated on the hardware configuration
described earlier for each of the five test groups. The first variation of TrustBuilder
was TB-noTRT, which does not support any trust preservation. Users are always
treated as strangers, and a trust negotiation process is repeated each time a user
requests a protected resource. This occurs even when the same user is repeatedly
32
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Figure 4.1: Various sized groups of users simultaneously negotiating trust for a protected resource.
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requesting the same resource.
The second variation of TrustBuilder was TB-TRT, with fully functional TRT
processing running at the server to issue trust resumption tokens. The client machine
was equipped with a semi-functional TRT capability that accepts a TRT issued from
the server and stores it at the client. However, the client does not submit a TRT
on subsequent visits to the server. The purpose for this variation is to measure the
overhead of generating the trust resumption tokens. Hereafter, this system is referred
to as TB-TRT-issue.
The third variation of TrustBuilder was also TB-TRT, with fully functional TRT
processing at both the client and server. A resumption token is pre-installed on the
client to permit the client to submit the TRT in every request to the server. The
purpose for this variation is to measure the throughput and response time when
clients return to a server and submit a TRT. Hereafter, this system is referred to as
TB-TRT-reuse.
All the experiments utilized a pharmacy trust negotiation scenario that involved
a three-round trust negotiation. The pharmacy scenario is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
In this scenario, the pharmacy (client) places a drug order from a pharmaceutical
company (server). The drug order is a sensitive resource, which the pharmaceutical
company only releases to parties with a valid pharmacy credential. The client possesses a valid pharmacy credential but will not disclose it without receiving a valid
pharmaceutical credential from the server. The server is willing to freely release its
pharmaceutical credential as proof to the pharmacy. Once received, the credential
is validated, which allows the client to release its sensitive credential. The server
verifies the received pharmacy credential which then fulfills the policy for the initial
drug order.
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Figure 4.2: A pharmacy scenario involving a three-round trust negotiation process.
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4.2

Results: throughput and response time
The pharmacy scenario described above was repeated one hundred times by each

user in each of the five test groups, for the three variations of TrustBuilder (TBnoTRT, TB-TRT-issue, TB-TRT-reuse).
The throughput of the server for each group was recorded. Throughput is defined
as the number of requests fulfilled by the server per minute. Based on the collected
data, the maximum throughput for a server running TB-noTRT is 107 requests per
minute. The maximum throughput for a server running TB-TRT-issue is 99 requests
per minute. The maximum throughput for a server running TB-TRT-reuse is approximately 180 requests per minute. These results are shown in Figure 4.3.
The results indicate that the overhead of generating a resumption token to clients
upon a successful negotiation is modest compared to the increased throughput when
using the trust resumption token to resume trust during a later session with the same
server. This has the potential for a significant performance improvement at the server
when clients make repeat visits.
The mean execution (response) time for each client is the time from when a request
for a protected resource is issued by a client to the time that the requested resource
is received from the server.
The mean response time for TB-TRT-issue is about one percent more than the
TB-noTRT. The mean response time for TB-TRT-reuse is about fifty percent less
than TB-noTRT. These results are shown in Figure 4.4.
These performance results show the potential for a server to increase its throughput and decrease its response time using a TRT when clients make repeat visits. With
a TRT, a client can clearly re-establish trust with a server more efficiently compared
to renegotiating trust from scratch.
An interesting question to consider from the results presented thus far is what
36
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Figure 4.3: Server throughput during trust negotiations involving a TRT.
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Figure 4.4: Mean response time for trust negotiations involving a TRT.
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percentage of requests to a server need to be from repeat customers in order for the
TRT to produce an overall savings. To answer this question, four use cases were
constructed based on the earlier measurements to predict the performance of the
system under various loads of repeat customers. The use cases assume that a server
provides a number of protected resources, and the number of users ranges from 5 to
25. Some percentage of the users request a resource that requires the same level of
trust that was negotiated during an earlier visit. Other users make initial requests
that require trust be negotiated from scratch.
The first use case (TRT 0%) assumes that all users are first-time visitors. In this
case, the server always performs the full traditional negotiation process and generates
a new resumption token. Although a resumption token was generated and issued by
the server during each request received by the server, none of the tokens were ever
used in later requests. Thus, the resources that were used to generate the token were
completely wasted.
The second use case (TRT 25%) assumes that 75% of the received requests are
first-time requests from a user. The other 25% of the requests are repeat visits that
require the same level of trust. The server performs a traditional negotiation process
on 75% of the received requests and generates a new resumption token. For the other
25% of the requests, the server is able to provide the requested resource with the TRT
the user submits.
The third use case (TRT 50%) assumes that half of the received requests are firsttime requests from a user. The other half of the requests are repeat visits that require
the same level of trust. The server performs a traditional negotiation process on half
of the received requests and generates a new resumption token. For the other half of
the requests, the server is able to provide the requested resource with the TRT the
user submits.
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The fourth use case (TRT 100%) assumes all the users are repeat customers that
require the same level of trust originally negotiated. In this use case, the server only
needs to perform the traditional negotiation process on users’ first request. Thereafter, the server can provide the requested resource with the TRT the user submits.
Figure 4.5 compares these four use cases with TB-noTRT, where a negotiation is
always performed regardless of the request pattern from its users. The comparison
shows the cumulative cost in seconds for various test configurations involving 5, 15,
or 25 users repeating a request from 1–5 times to a server. The cost is an estimate
based on the average response time shown in Figure 4.4. The results indicate that
the overhead of handling the TRT can be recouped when approximately 25% of the
requests to a server are from repeat customers. The throughput and response time
improve up to approximately 33% as the percentage of repeat customers grows to
100%.
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Figure 4.5: An estimate of the cumulative cost of a trust negotiation while varying the
number of users, number of requests per user, and the percentage of repeat customers.
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This chapter describes work related to trust preservation.

5.1

Cookies
HTTP is a stateless protocol where each request is treated as a brand new request

with no correlation to any prior request made by the same user. Cookies are a mechanism to preserve state between HTTP requests and responses. Typically, cookies
are small files approximately 1KB in size [10].
A web server generates a cookie containing client state information and delivers
it to a browser. If the browser is configured to accept cookies, the browser will store
the cookie on the client’s computer. Depending on the expiration date, a cookie
remains on the client’s hard drive after the browser is terminated. This processing is
transparent to the user.
When a client reconnects to a server that previously issued a cookie to the client,
the cookie is returned to the server as part of the HTTP request header, assuming the
cookie has not expired. The server state is restored from the information contained
in the cookie. Generally, the state information included in cookies are single sign-on
information, user preferences, or the contents of a shopping cart [12].
Similar to cookies, the trust resumption tokens presented in this thesis are authenticators generated by a server and stored at the client. Trust resumption tokens can
be implemented using cookies. However, this would limit the use of trust resumption
tokens to the HTTP protocol. There are risks to storing authentication information
on client computers. The trust resumption token presented in this thesis is designed
to prevent well-known attacks against cookies [5], as discussed in Chapter 2.
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5.2

Kerberos tickets
Kerberos tickets preserve authentication information. In Kerberos, the Authen-

tication Server (AS) generates a ticket that preserves the client’s authentication by
creating a session key that is shared between the client and the TGS. The ticket is not
attribute-based but provides evidence that the user has knowledge of the password
or possesses the private key of the certificate that was used during authentication.
With password-based authentication and some certificate-based authentication,
Kerberos requires a pre-existing relationship between a client and the AS before the
client can access any services. In these cases, the Kerberos system administrator
creates and manages a list of user accounts. In contrast, trust negotiation is used to
establish trust between entities that have no prior relationship.
The design of trust resumption tokens presented in Chapter 2 has similarities to
the Kerberos method of preserving the client’s authentication. A TRT maintains the
level of trust by creating a token containing the client’s authentication information.
The client presents this token to the server in order to re-authenticate to the same level
of trust that was previously established. In Kerberos, the session key must be carefully
protected by both the client and the TGT. In a system using the TRT, the private
keys of the credentials whose attributes appear in the TRT must be protected, even
though the TRT can be freely disclosed as long as the user is comfortable disclosing
the attributes it contains. Mere possession of the credential is not sufficient to gain
access to the server—the client must prove ownership of the credential. Unlike a
Kerberos session key, these private keys are not shared with the other participating
party. Section 2.2.1 discussed how this was done in more detail.
5.3

Trust negotiation in session level protocols
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a session-layer protocol that establishes a secure

connection between a client and a server. Authentication in TLS requires computa42

5.3. TRUST NEGOTIATION IN SESSION LEVEL PROTOCOLS
tionally expensive public-key operations [13]. In order to reduce the cost of a client
and server re-authenticating each other, TLS supports session resumption. If a TLS
server is configured to allow session resumption, the client is presented with a session
identifier during the initial TLS handshake. When the session completes, the client
and server store the session identifier and some cryptographic parameters relevant
to the session. When the client returns to the server, the client presents the session
identifier. If the server still remembers the session, the client and server use the
cryptographic parameters from the previous session to establish new keying material
to secure the new session. This avoids the costly public-key operations that were
necessary to secure the first session.

Previous research in trust negotiation integrates trust negotiation into Transport
Layer Security (TLS), but does not consider how the trust established during a session
can be maintained [6]. Trust negotiation can be costly in terms of computation and
number of number of rounds of communication. A recently completed thesis discusses
how authentication information can be cached in the session-layer protocol to improve
efficiency over the course of a session [8]. The thesis also discusses some issues related
to caching trust during a session, demonstrates the necessity of maintaining the trust
that is established during a session, and describes how trust can be cached in TLS [8].

Unlike the multi-session trust maintenance methods proposed in this thesis, TLS
session resumption requires the server to maintain session state. Traditional trust negotiation may require a large number of public-key operations compared to traditional
TLS authentication. When trust negotiation requires a large number of public-key
operations, the use of a TRT during subsequent visits reduces the number of required
public-key operations to a single credential validation and ownership verification.
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5.4

Single sign-on
Single sign-on (SSO) is an approach whereby a user can authenticate once to access

a protected resource and be granted access to other protected resources without the
need to repeatedly enter a password. SSO automates user authentication processes
by managing user passwords. The goal of SSO is to reduce human error and increase
usability and efficiency.
Similar to SSO, trust negotiation is automated to reduce human error and increase
usability. In contrast to SSO, which enables a principal to authenticate once and
repeatedly access authorized resources, the current design of TrustBuilder does not
provide any way to preserve a trust relationship beyond the current session except
through renegotiation. In other words, trust is not persistent in the current model.
Preserving the trust established across multiple sessions is similar to many single
sign-on paradigms like the Liberty Alliance Project [7] and Microsoft Passport [11].
In contrast to the Liberty Alliance Project and Microsoft Passport, trust negotiation
enabled single sign-on is attribute-based. The alliance usage model for TRT presented
in Section 2.2.2 permits the same authentication token to satisfy different access
control policies across several servers that agree on a common set of attributes.
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In this thesis, two approaches to preserving trust across multiple sessions in open
systems were presented. Previous work in trust negotiation was based on a simple
model of per-request access control, and did not address the issue of preserving trust
across sessions.
The first approach is to create a trust resumption token, which captures the details
of a trust negotiation sufficient for trust to be efficiently resumed during a later session.
The second is the integration of existing systems, namely KeyNote and Kerberos,
with trust negotiation to leverage their authenticator, the KeyNote assertions and the
Kerberos ticketing service, for trust preservation. This integration experience provides
a roadmap to make existing systems (KeyNote and Kerberos services) available to
strangers outside their security domain (e.g., outside a Kerberos realm).
The contribution of this thesis is the application of ideas similar to the concept of
single-sign-on in identity-based systems, but applied to the problem of authentication
in open systems using trust negotiation.
Support for a trust resumption token was implemented in TrustBuilder, a prototype system for trust negotiation. The performance analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates the potential of these approaches to improve the performance of trust negotiation compared to a system that does not preserve trust when there is a a modest amount of repeated access. Trust persistence promises to make authenticating
strangers in open systems more efficient. Trust persistence also allows strangers to
make friends—the relationship of trust persists because the parties involved are no
longer unknown to each other. Having authenticated each other once, they do not
need to perform the same expensive operations to resume the prior level of authenti45
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cation.
The initial implementation of trust preservation in TrustBuilder stores attributes
in the TRT. An interesting alternative to explore in the future is to store roles in
the TRT. Both approaches offer advantages to applications. Storing attributes in the
TRT reduces the risk of a client retaining invalid permission to access a resource when
there is a change in the policy that maps attributes to a role. When policies are less
likely change, storing a role in the TRT eliminates the need to repeatedly derive the
role from the attributes when resources are accessed that require that role.
This thesis focused on enabling a client to resume trust with a server. If a client
were to present a trust resumption token to a server, the server could easily regain
trust established with the client. This approach would require a server to store a
TRT for every client that accesses it. For high-volume servers, this could be a burden.
Identifying techniques to reduce the burden on a server storing a TRT may be worth
further exploration.
In a peer-to-peer scenario, the client-server role is often interchangeable between
negotiation parties. The relationships or transactions between these parties are often transient; however, when the relationships are not transient, one might want to
preserve the trust established via the negotiation process. Issues pertaining to trust
preservation in a peer-to-peer scenario are also a topic for future research.
This thesis presents a high-level design of integrating TrustBuilder with Kerberos.
An implementation of these ideas in Kerberos will extend its authentication facilities
to strangers outside a Kerberos realm. In addition, the alliance usage model for TRT
presented in Section 2.2.2 raises new opportunities for future work.
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